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Abstract
Interactive constructivism and its implications for education will be introduced 
in four steps. (1) The context of the approach and its relation to other constructiv-
ist developments will be discussed. (2) I will examine essential pragmatic criteria 
in the tradition of John Dewey that are relevant for interactive constructivism. 
(3) More decisively than Dewey interactive constructivism launches a meta-theo-
retical distinction between observers, participants, and agents. (4) Communica-
tion as a chief dimension of education can be analyzed out of three perspectives: 
the symbolic, the imaginative, and the real. Educators must recognize that their 
interaction with learners includes great demands not only in practical application/
implementation but also in theoretical reflection.
Contexts of Interactive Constructivism
The German school and university system is strongly content based. The fixation 
and standardization of subject matter (Bildung) has been at the center of German 
discussions on education and schooling from the nineteenth century on. Tradi-
tionally in Germany this focus on the contents of learning has been accompanied 
with an underestimation of the import of communication and lived relationships 
(cf. Reich 2006). A tripartite school system was established to represent the neces-
sary contents in different classes of students for different occupations after school. 
For the elites this has been the Gymnasium, for the more technical occupations the 
Realschule, and for the lower class of workers of all kinds the Volksschule, which 
is now called Hauptschule. For those who drop out of the regular school system, a 
Sonderschule was established and has today even become a regular part of the se-
lection model. In times of the economical upswing after the Second World War, 
the content-oriented school policy was functional in that it helped to give clear 
orientation for the distribution of different graduates with different skills for dif-
ferent occupations. Social integration was mainly guaranteed by tradition and a 
general conservatism. The German labor market seemed to confirm the success 
of the model. But in the last decades the transition into the more global markets 
with higher levels of lifelong learning on one side and a high level of unemploy-
ment on the other, with more needs for communicative and social competences, 
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with a decline of family traditions and values, and with high migration movements 
entailed increasing failure of the German content-oriented model of schooling (cf. 
Schnepf 2002).
The German content-centered model of schooling represented a type of 
knowledge and discourse that was based on the idea of permanent, universal, and 
unequivocal truth claims. In this model long-lasting curricula were practiced. Ex-
perience was largely restricted to its cognitive dimensions. Today, Germany suffers 
from the growing contradictions between the effects of this traditional model and 
the requirements of a changing, dynamic, pluralist, and post-traditional world. 
These developments have largely been mirrored in philosophical discourses and the 
social sciences of the last decades. They have been accompanied by challenges for 
education and educational theories worldwide. The changed status of knowledge 
in postmodernity has completely altered our understanding of learning and cur-
ricula. Approaches have come to the fore which emphasize the idea of constructing 
knowledge instead of metaphysical notions about the fundaments of learning or 
naive copy theories. More decidedly than before these newer approaches point to 
the historical changes and developments of knowledge as well as to our responsibil-
ity to take into account the different versions of knowledge constructed in different 
contexts of time and place. However, these insights are not completely new. There 
are a lot of precursors for constructivist theories of learning and education. Figure 
1 in the upper part lists some essential approaches that have had a main influence 
on current constructivist approaches and gives an overview on the most influential 
schools in Germany today.
From the side of philosophy, there is first phenomenology which had a big 
impact on constructivist thought e.g., through the work of Berger/Luckmann 
(1966). Pragmatism was and is important for establishing theoretical foundations 
for understanding the relation of acting and constructing. Different postmodern 
discourses have sharpened our recognition of the import of deconstruction, es-
pecially in the context of post-structuralism (with regard to discourses), cultural 
studies (with regard to cultures), feminism (with regard to gender). All of them 
have not only been influential but show to a large extend an implicit social con-
structivism.1 
Precursors in psychology are above all Jean Piaget and his constructive psy-
chology. His work has especially been the starting point of Ernst von Glasersfeld’s 
(1995) radical constructivism. But also Vygotsky comes to mind, who has been 
much more influential in English-speaking communities. His significance has 
among others been elaborated and promoted by Jerome Bruner, who has had a ma-
jor influence on constructivist-oriented theories of teaching and learning.2 Tradi-
tions of humanist psychology as represented by Erich Fromm, Carl Rogers, Ruth 
Cohen and others have broadened the focus of psychological research to include 
aspects of communication and interaction in culture and education. These are to-
day very important fields of discussion in all social- and cultural-oriented brands 
of constructivism. Family therapy sheds particular light on lived relationships and 
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networks of relations. In Germany more than in the English-speaking world this 
had a direct impact on teaching and learning theories. Constructivist education 
has developed methods of teaching informed by systemic concepts.
Since the 1960s cybernetics has been another major influence on the devel-
opment of constructivist thought. Here Heinz von Foerster (1987, 1992) has to be 
mentioned first of all. Related developments have taken place in fields like biology 
and neuroscience. The approach of Maturana and Varela (1978, 1988) was crucial 
for the promotion of radical constructivism. The naturalism implied in this move-
ment has been criticized by social constructivists. In the field of sociology systems 
theory has been further elaborated by Niklas Luhmann.
As to communication, the contribution of theories developed especially by 
Bateson (2000, 2002), Watzlawick and others3 is of utmost importance. From the 
Figure 1. Constructivist sources and approaches in an overall view
E&C ♦  Education and Culture
10  ♦ Kersten Reich
very start the development of these communication theories has been character-
ized by a strong tendency towards constructivism.
John Dewey’s pragmatism is considered by many observers today as the 
most important precursor for social constructivism. His philosophy is important 
for issues of foundation as well as for educational perspectives in constructivism.4 
Unfortunately, in the German discussion up to this day the reception of Dewey’s 
philosophy as well as his educational theories is still lagging behind. 5
The lower part of Figure 1 refers to the most important constructivist ap-
proaches in Germany. Methodological constructivism, as founded by Wilhelm 
Kamlah and Paul Lorenzen, has partly been transformed into cultural theory. 
This approach focuses on a critical reconstruction of the cultural genesis of so-
called prototypes, i.e., basic scientific categories and methodologies as performed 
in discursive activities. Thereby the dominant interest lies in the reconstruction 
of means-ends-rationality. Starting from the perspective of applications, it tries to 
analyze the presumptions according to which the sciences always proceed. Today, 
Peter Janich is the main proponent of this approach in Germany. 
Radical constructivism shows a highly subjectivist attitude. Its main advo-
cates, Heinz von Foerster (e.g. 1992) and Ernst von Glasersfeld (e.g. 1995), have 
stressed the subjective dimensions of constructing knowledge. They attempt to 
consider individual constructions in all their diversity as different possibilities and 
viabilities to cope with reality. However, insights from philosophical discussions 
on postmodernity, and developments of critical thinking in twentieth-century 
cultural theories are largely neglected in their works. In the background of this 
approach is a discursive reflection on changes in the sciences, especially the emer-
gence of cybernetics as well as developments in linguistics, cognitive psychology, 
and biology. The works of Gregory Bateson, Humberto Maturana and Maturana/
Varela (1988) are most important in the development of this approach. Here the 
subjectivist view is obvious. 
The two arrows in the figure indicate that there has been a social and cultural 
turn in constructivism in the last years. They point towards social constructivism 
as a generic term for quite a number of different approaches. For example, versions 
of social constructivism have been launched by Berger/Luckmann (1966), Knorr-
Cetina (1981, 1999) and in the socio-psychological works of Gergen (e.g. 1991, 1994, 
1999). Interactive constructivism is another example here.
The cultural turn today shows constructivism as a part of the complex dis-
courses in the humanities. The Cologne approach of interactive constructivism 
offers many reflections and instruments for creating perspectives on constructivist 
education. By now the approach is well-known and practiced in German teacher 
education and training.6 The approach is based on an extensive philosophical 
background. Especially, it takes up threads indicated above like poststructuralism, 
postmodernism, and cultural studies—e.g., in the works of Michel Foucault, Jean-
François Lyotard, Jacques Derrida, Zygmunt Bauman, Anthony Giddens, Stuart 
Hall and others. In the field of educational theory it draws on diverse approaches 
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that flow from a multimodal, multidimensional and multiparticipant understand-
ing of learning processes (cf. e.g. Kress et al. 2005).7 It is an essential claim of the 
approach not only to elaborate suggestions for practical instruction, but to reflect 
on the broader cultural conditions and contexts of learning.
In this essay I will give a brief introduction to some crucial issues in the 
program of interactive constructivism. Among these is first the reference to John 
Dewey because his works in many respects have laid foundations for the elaboration 
of the approach. I will then discuss briefly the three core perspectives of observer, 
participant, and agent in interactive constructivism and indicate some differences 
to Dewey. I will close by introducing three important perspectives on communica-
tion: the symbolic, the imaginative, and the real. 
Pragmatist Criteria Are Still Relevant  
for Interactive Constructivism
A pragmatic turn in education has been established particularly by John Dewey, 
whose works can still give orientation to educational goals, methods, and practices as 
well as theoretical reflections today. Experience, a term having strong connotations 
of activity, is the basic pragmatic concept in Dewey. It indicates also the starting 
point and aim of learning and gives us criteria of successful individual and social 
learning processes. In a comprehensive view, such learning constitutes growth. 
We learn by experience, by interactions, which enable us to learn things we can 
use again in future actions. Thus, we grow in our active learning (experiencing) 
and change our actions through learning (experienced). From the perspective of 
interactive constructivism, several important criteria already implied in Dewey’s 
work are particularly relevant for a constructivist interpretation of pragmatism. I 
would like to summarize some of these criteria briefly:
• Learning by doing: “Every educative process should begin with do-
ing something; and the necessary training of sense perception, 
memory, imagination and judgment should grow out of the con-
ditions and needs of what is being done” (MW 4, 185). In this 
sense it is important for learners to have access to multimodal 
ways of experiencing and to be able to use, expand, or change 
the experienced in further experience. Therefore, growth should 
be made the supreme principle of all learning. Mere learning for 
learning’s sake is hostile to a pragmatic and constructive perspec-
tive. 
• Context: Learning always takes place within a context, in an envi-
ronment, and the most important aspect of a learning environ-
ment is the learners’ interactions. Such interactions take place be-
tween learners and other learners, between learners and teachers, 
and between learners and subject matter. Learners need an envi-
ronment which is open to the learner’s own actions, the discovery 
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of problems and solutions from the learner’s point of view. Dew-
ey’s concept of inquiry emphasized the importance of experimen-
tal environments. In this perspective, learning is always situational 
and relational, involving what Dewey calls the positions of “spec-
tator,” “participant,” and “agent” (cf. MW 9, 131). Although simi-
lar situations may lead different learners to similar solutions, each 
learning situation is unique and its solution is specific (cf. LW 5, 
127). 
• Democracy in Education: Democracy in education has two power-
ful resources for learning: freedom and participation. On the one 
hand, learners must be free to preserve and expand those spaces, 
which enable them to go their own way. Teachers must not restrict 
learning to an uncritical adaptation of knowledge but have to pro-
vide opportunities for individual inquiries, interpretations, and 
judgments. This can only be accomplished if extensive partici-
pation is made possible. If democracy is just part of the syllabus 
taught from outside, this will work against a lively interest in de-
mocracy. 
• Interaction: Interactions challenge us to always take into account 
the social background and effects whenever we teach and learn. 
Since learning should aim at growth, we have to support all learn-
ers—especially those suffering from social disadvantages—and 
increase their chances of learning and acting. For Dewey, commu-
nication within a supportive community of learning is the chief 
instrument of democracy in education. Such communication does 
not take place only on the level of contents or subject matter, but 
always rests on lived relationships connected with everyday envi-
ronments and cultural contexts of learning. 
Education: Observers, Participants, and Agents
Taking these considerations into account, interactive constructivism brings the 
distinction between three different perspectives in and on education to the fore 
(cf. Reich 2003, 2007): 
(1) As an observer, we focus all our senses on what surrounds us and what we are 
thinking and doing in our experience. We take the position of a self-observer when-
ever we reflect on our own experience. And we take the position of a distant-observer 
whenever we observe others and judge their actions and articulations. We also take 
the position of a distant-observer whenever we try to transcend our habitual posi-
tion of observing and look at ourselves critically from an imagined outside position. 
Observers make observations. As shown in Figure 2, the observer is a position that 
is always subjective. Each experience of observation has its singular moment. But 
for interactive constructivism, observation is also always embedded in a cultural 
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context. Therefore, constructivism cannot be mere subjectivism—an assumption 
overemphasized by radical constructivism (cf. von Glasersfeld 1995)—but needs 
perspectives on social and cultural interactions, as in Dewey. Observations are part 
of an interpretive net of interconnected perceptions, attitudes, beliefs, claims, and 
habits. Alternating between self- and distant-observing, the observer has some 
freedom in his interpretations, but culture sets limits. In making use of this free-
dom, imaginations play a big role. Already Dewey knew that observations and their 
symbolic articulations are driven by imagination. Observers construct from their 
observations different versions of reality and “truths.” For constructivism, each 
version of reality constitutes its own perspective, and a change of observing results 
in a change of perspectives. But there is 
no ultimate or best observer. Neither is 
there, in the succession and juxtaposi-
tion of observations, a comprehensive 
and complete knowledge of true obser-
vations for all times and circumstances. 
We have to concede plurality and di-
versity, instead, although all observ-
ers at the same time are constrained by 
cultural conventions. As members of a 
particular culture, we observe within 
the given context of this culture. In al-
ways being cultural participants as well 
as observers, the freedom of our obser-
vations is limited.
Figure 2
Difficult within this concept is the claim that we have to realize two perspec-
tives in two steps. On the one hand we have to observe ourselves as if we could 
look from the outside as an external observer. On the other hand we are always 
looking from our inner position as a self-observer. My assertion is that we are able 
to exceed the position of self-observing by interacting with others. The feedback 
that we get in interactions may then be internalized and become a kind of inner 
dialogue we lead with ourselves. In any case the tension between self- and dis-
tant-observing presupposes open-mindedness, self-criticism, tolerance of frus-
tration and ambivalence. Dewey already knew that some individuals have special 
abilities to empathize with others. They are particularly sensible and can imagine 
the expectations and interests of others. But cultural change, with an increase of 
pluralism, diversity, cultural and migration differences, entails the necessity to 
educate and nurture this sensitivity for all observers. In social communication 
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this competence has become so important that we have to spend a lot of time in 
education to achieve it. Since the contents of learning are always embedded in 
and communicated through lived relationships with others, relationships them-
selves have become a primary concern of education. At the same time the space 
and liberty of interpretation has grown in our culture. The different versions of 
reality constructions that are present in any communicative situation demand 
social open-mindedness. We cannot rely on traditions or rituals the way other 
generations did. In responding to unambiguity and ambivalence we must balance 
out our more complex communication and an open attitude by changing in our 
observations between the inner and outer views. Dewey had his focus mainly on 
the role of the participant and the agent. For him the observer is rather a specta-
tor than an active part of our communicative competences. Dewey emphasizes 
the direct connection between observing and partaking. But in postmodernity 
the split between observing and participation has grown, and it is even possible 
to come to a contradictory use of the roles. The observer in our times has eman-
cipated himself in many ways from his participations or actions: He may com-
pletely forget or ignore in which community of understanding he lives and what 
norms, values, and ideas are important to him in judging his observations. The 
greater diversity of possible (maybe only imagined) participations enables on the 
one hand greater freedom of observation. On the other hand forgetfulness about 
contexts of participation often prevents us from critical reflection. In the media, 
e.g., in film and television, we have established a big industry that provides us with 
occasions for this forgetfulness. And this position is combined with inactivity 
because we are captured by our observations and take them as actions. But they 
are only rudimentary actions without the possibility to construct new versions of 
reality that are created out of our own wishes and needs. Both the forgetfulness 
and the inactivity have to be questioned: The forgetfulness of our participative 
commitments and chances opens the door for all kinds of manipulations and 
persuasions. The active observing position turns out to be inactivity in the life-
world. But often we do not notice this inactivity and the reduction of our pos-
sible activities that it involves, because this kind of observation is combined with 
entertainment and joy. To give us critical perspectives for reflecting the chances 
and dangers of observing and the roles of observers, we must develop a theory 
of the observer that examines the complex interrelations between observations, 
participation and actions.
(2) We are participants in being members of a community (organized by chance 
or institution) that shares particular ways of finding meanings and of communi-
cating and thus provides contexts for observing and acting. As observers we seem 
free, as participants (see Figure 3) we are always attached to numerous basic un-
derstandings that have long been fixed and are conditions of participation—social 
norms, values, conventions, and morals. Every participation is at the same time 
a commitment—like being a feminist, a Christian, an atheist, a member of an 
ethnic group, a member of a political party, a scientific, social, economic or other 
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community with its particular interpretations, etc. Participation always involves 
identity. But in postmodern times identity means identities (cf. e.g. Bauman 1997, 
2000): a plurality of possible identifications out of overlapping, partial, ambivalent, 
sometimes contradictory and also changing participations. These participations 
may even result in a number of inconsistent combinations of commitments (one 
may, for example, participate in ecological groups while at the same time driving a 
car). Observation and participation are culturally interwoven. To reflect critically 
on our experiences, we need to participate in communities of interpreters and/or 
inquirers. Inquiry is a cultural instrument for solving problems (cf. LW 12), while 
the understanding of problems and their solutions is always a cultural interpre-
tation. In interactive constructivism, interpretive communities are embedded in 
practices, routines, and institutions—cultural conditions of participation that are 
often taken for granted in our observations. Therefore, it is decisive for a critical 
observer theory to distinguish between these different perspectives and to take 
their effect on our observations and participations into account. 
Figure 3
Dewey already distinguishes sometimes between participants and other 
roles. But he did not develop a systematic and sufficiently elaborated theory of 
the relation between the complex and possibly even contradictory roles of observ-
ers and participants (cf. Reich 2007). In view of the role of participants, however, 
Dewey gives us a rich account of the conditions and effects of communication in 
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life-worlds. For him the participative role in human communication is decisive: 
“Men associate in many ways. But the only form of association that is truly hu-
mane, and not a gregarious gathering for warmth and protection, or a mere device 
for efficiency in outer action, is the participation in meanings and goods that is 
effected by communication” (LW 10, 249). A positive communication for human 
and social growth thus is an active participation in a community of democratic 
practice. Dewey is aware of the fact that this democratic participation is often more 
an ideal than reality, but this makes him even more determined to demand more 
democracy. Democratic practices and institutions are embedded in historical pro-
cess and here the chances of participation change. For Dewey the only solution to 
further the process of democracy is to make the role of participation as large as 
possible. This enlargement is especially crucial for education because in education 
the above-mentioned criteria (experience, context, democracy, interaction) have 
to be combined with a concept of participation. As educators and teachers we must 
provide good examples in participative communities to give clear social models, 
orientations, and ways of critical reflection. Every new generation that is educated 
will establish its values in interaction with examples we give. If we are too forgetful 
about partaking and focus only on observations then we cannot expect to be suc-
cessful in the way of furthering democratic values and practices. This is a dilemma 
of much content-centred teaching, where observations contained in curricula and 
schoolbooks tempt learners to observe only superficially and to learn reproductively 
without developing competencies of partaking in shared inquiries. 
In Richard Rorty’s version of pragmatism the risks of the role of participants 
are reflected for our times. He concludes from a perspective of different versions 
of realities as viewed in Western cultures, that there can be no solution, in the long 
run, as to which explanation of desirable realities is more justified or effective than 
others. Our partaking in democratic processes loses its clarity. There are no final 
reasons for choosing between different versions of better participation or wrong 
ways of partaking. No meta-narrative, no theory of human nature, no metaphysics, 
or even theology can establish an unambiguous foundation for the just community 
and the right participation. Therefore we have to be critical vis-à-vis all our roles 
of participation and our practices, routines, and institutions. Do we really achieve 
as much participation as we need? Or is the critical reflection of our actual par-
ticipation already destroyed by the dominance of observer roles that we take? The 
performance of observing and constructing does not necessarily imply a general, 
universal, and correct criterion for all claims of validity. Warranty is found in the 
performances themselves in the context of the cultural and always ethnocentric in-
terpretations of the ways we live (cf. Rorty 2000). But he is especially critical about 
any preconception by philosophers of Dewey about the way we should live. Such 
pre-decisions have shown their futility too many times to be convincing anymore. 
Philosophers should keep their hands off people’s affairs and leave them alone (cf. 
Rorty 1991, 194); they should care about tolerance rather than emancipation (ibid., 
213). In privacy one can cultivate the irony that is necessary for critical reflection. 
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The aim of irony, for Rorty, is not arrogance but modesty. This position changes 
our understanding of participation in education. Now it is the learners themselves 
who must interpret the contexts they live in and decide about the kinds of partici-
pation they will and can take. But decisions are limited. Postmodern irony and 
freedom is not appropriate for public matters like government and constitution, 
for laws and justice, for liberties in political life. Here, at least the possibilities of 
democratic participation on a larger scale have to be enabled. Education is one main 
resource to gain habits that respect participation in groups and communities. For 
Rorty, liberals must protect democratic political conditions to secure the possibility 
of ironic self-reflection and the diversity of aesthetic lives. The point is to organize 
private and public life in participative roles that support diversity and pluralism as 
concrete choices of people with democratic orientations.
In postmodernity the contradiction between freedom and solidarity has 
grown. As observers we enjoy, for example, the pluralism, diversity, heterogeneity, 
and ambivalence of our observations. Here we can act very open and free. But as 
participants in the ecstasies of such freedom we nevertheless need a frame of soli-
darity that provides sufficient support in an economic, social, cultural, political or 
other sense. This necessary solidarity of participants delimits Rorty’s liberalism. 
To balance between our observer and participant roles in learning, we have to ac-
knowledge that forgetfulness about the conditions of our participation in groups, 
communities, and societies can be dangerous. Its puts at risk our own security as 
well as the prosperity and democratic quality of the communities in which we par-
ticipate. Therefore a democratic education has to cultivate critical reflection on the 
balance between observing and partaking roles. The interrelation between these 
roles should not develop arbitrarily. Rorty’s ironic position is helpful here because 
it suggests a way of combining the roles without taking refuge in one-sided or 
dogmatic views that stand in opposition to our current life-world. But irony is not 
sufficient for the necessary critical reflection. Here it seems fruitful to reconstruct 
Dewey’s project of democratic education. This requires beyond irony the struggle 
for more equity, social justice and political and communicative participation. This 
is what critical educators all over the world experience day by day: their visions of 
solidarity time and again have to face the threat of political or economical short-
comings. The must leave the position of an inner irony as well as the circle of a com-
munity of ironists if they are to participate more effectively in critical discourses 
and actions. In comparison irony provides a more passive observer position. What 
is needed is to penetrate more deeply into an understanding of the complex social 
and cultural contexts of education and to participate in critical practice with a view 
to further democratic contexts.
(3) As an agent, it often seems that we act without first observing. Moreover we 
sometimes seem to be able to act without participating. But this at best only ap-
plies to very spontaneous action. As reflection shows, the appearance in most cases 
is due to our being forgetful about the contexts of our actions—and then others 
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may reproach us for our forgetfulness. As shown in Figure 4, the agent is the ac-
tive subject of experience with all his/her senses. The agent expresses and articu-
lates his/her actions, which become interactions by being responded to by others. 
Performance, situated agency, or reactions to events are perspectives of possible 
observation to reflect from the position of the agent or from an outer position on 
the different aspects of action. In this connection, previous observations and par-
ticipation play an important role in our understanding the claims and goals, the 
meanings and constructed truths of actions. Often, however, the cultural contexts 
of action remain ambiguous because participation and observations cannot always 
be constructed as a single version of reality. Even in rather conventional fields of 
technology and science such a quest for unambiguous knowledge is not possible 
without taking risks. There may even be blind spots that our observation cannot 
control. But although action always implies precariousness, the best we can do is 
to act with good reason and to critically reflect on our actions by relating the three 
perspectives of observer, participant, and agent with each other.
Figure 4
Dewey has developed a clear understanding of the relation between partici-
pation and action. In his model of experience, action is always interwoven with re-
flection. In education the combination of action and thought is therefore essential: 
“In all its activities the school will be concerned to advance its ideal of personality 
through situations in which thought and action are each developed in terms of the 
other. With increasing maturity its basic conception of participation . . . becomes 
clarified and expanded. To further this clarification and expansion the school will 
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take steps, as opportunity presents itself, to enable young people to share with 
their elders in enterprises which are intended to promote the common good. If 
this end is to be satisfactorily achieved, however, all participation in such adult 
enterprises—whether this participation be in the form of direct action or through 
the imagination and the emotions—must have a reference to the progressive dis-
covery of the discrepancies and contradictions which lie back of our present-day 
social living” (LW 11, 557).
For interactive constructivism, the systematic distinction between these 
three perspectives marks points in common and differences between constructiv-
ism and pragmatism. Although already in Dewey one finds anticipations of the 
distinction, it is not sufficiently developed as a critical part of a meta-theory. Such 
theory gives us clues for observing others and ourselves more systematically. It is 
also a prerequisite for reflecting on conditions of observation. Especially for educa-
tion in a democracy, the distinction is important. The change and diversity of per-
spectives thus envisioned is necessary in order for us to be able to relate increasing 
freedom with chances of communication and participation under conditions of 
solidarity (cf. Rorty 1989). With regard to the learner (student and teacher), s/he 
must be seen as an active constructor of her own learning experiences (agent). In 
order to learn, s/he must communicate with others in the contexts of a culture, i.e. 
s/he partakes in a community of learning (participant). Observation is a necessary 
condition for doing so and for reflecting on this doing (observer). Each of these 
perspectives must provide sufficiently deep insights to avoid naïve and superficial 
perspectives in education. This calls for additional reflections on communication, 
learning, and teaching.
If we neglected one of these perspectives, our view would suffer a lack of 
differentiation. We would see ourselves as observers only, involved in neither par-
ticipation nor action; we would overplay the importance of participation instead 
of asking for a potential variety and diversity of observers or for more opportuni-
ties to act; we would remain in action for action’s sake, without reflecting upon 
observations and conditions of participation that influence our actions or result 
from them. 
In order to consider the interrelation of the three roles more closely and more 
precisely with regard to cultural contexts, I will introduce three further theoreti-
cal perspectives that are central to interactive constructivism.
Communication: Symbolic Representation,  
Imagination, and Real Events
Symbolic representations (cf. Hall 1997) constitute a basic dimension of human 
communication. The symbolic delimits cultural understanding and interpretation. 
As Ernst Cassirer (1957) has shown in his Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, these forms 
comprise all signs in culture, like gestures, languages, images, icons etc. Structur-
alist semiotics has emphasized the context of symbolic orders in any language or 
structure of signs. Jacques Lacan (e.g. 2006) has elaborated a theory that supple-
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ments the symbolic with the imaginative (English translations of Lacan here often 
use the term “imaginary”). No culture and its manifestations—like art, religion, 
science, etc.—can do without the symbolic, yet the symbolic without the imagina-
tive is empty. The symbolic defines the ways of dealing with imagination through 
which we really learn how to register, talk about, and discuss experiences systemati-
cally. It thus helps us to specify experiences and to render emotions and impulses 
comprehensible, conceivable, and communicable. In education there is always an 
emphasis on the symbolic because learners have to acquire cultural knowledge and 
skills. The dominance of the symbolic alone and the restriction of the symbolic to 
acts of narrow reproduction of knowledge—as in the German content-oriented 
school system—is an enemy of pragmatism and constructivism:
1. Symbolic learning not only refers to the acquisition of knowledge 
as given, but also concerns the contexts of knowledge and knowl-
edge construction. This implies skills of communication, inquiry, 
experiment, and the appropriate habits.
2. The symbolic is never complete. There can be no list of final sub-
ject matters. Learners always have to be open to new experiences. 
And lifelong learning and teaching more and more have to pro-
vide opportunities for learning to learn.
3. The very fast-changing symbolic subject matter engenders rel-
evant changes of cultural understanding more rapidly than in 
former times. But at the same time knowledge itself has increased 
extremely. Therefore the selection of content is a more and more 
precarious problem. The reflection on the relation between partic-
ipation and democratic education suggests that teachers and stu-
dents must find their own viable solutions. These solutions have 
to be connected with cultural requirements and individual experi-
ences. Thus local participation comes to the foreground as a need 
for effective education and teaching.
4. The symbolic is driven by imagination and emotions. It is realized 
in relationships. The imagination of individuals plays an impor-
tant role in choosing contents and developing learning. Imagi-
nation as understood here is more than cognition. It stands for 
desire and emotion as well. We cannot fully grasp the desire for 
the imaginative through symbolic communication alone. In the 
light of increasing diversity of life-worlds and lived relationships 
in postmodernity, emotions and desires have to be taken into ac-
count in education more than before.
In this context it is still a challenge for pragmatists and constructivists to-
day to look for a theoretical exchange with psychoanalysis and theories that have 
been developed out of this paradigm. Even if we should not adopt psychoanalysis 
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uncritically, there are some interesting developments here that can broaden our 
horizons. This is especially essential in discussing the imaginative. The imagi-
native prevents us from being able to see others the way they “are,” independent 
from our own imaginative perspective. We encounter them with desire, emo-
tions, requests, and motives. Very often humans do not seem made for solidarity 
and social coherence, focused as they are on their egocentric perspectives. Yet, 
in our relationships we still depend, most of all, on our imaginations by means 
of which we are connected with others, even if the connection may turn out to 
be illusory. In education we need the imaginative as the desire that inspires us in 
the relationships with others. It appears not only in emotional learning, but also 
in those hopes and visions that guide all learning and inform it with insight and 
meaning. In psychoanalysis the imaginative is a concept that among other things 
reminds us of the unconscious dimensions of communication. What urges us to 
do certain things? Why do these things and not others? What is it that determines 
our preferences, omissions, sympathies, and antipathies? In our daydreams, many 
things work that neither count nor are possible in the world. How often do we 
wish to control our fellow humans’ imaginations—is not advertising the increas-
ing evidence hereof? 
Already Dewey saw that at the beginning of every learning experience there 
must be an imagination of what the problem is and how the learner may respond 
to it. Without this imagination, there would be no reward in learning. Teachers 
must invest all necessary educative efforts in providing opportunities for a sym-
bolic and imaginative learning so that the learners can imagine the meaning of 
the experience. This is only possible if the teachers’ own imaginative desires are 
alive. But Dewey discussed the combination of the symbolic and the imaginative 
in a more rational and instrumental way. The critical examination of psychoanaly-
sis or other theories that are concerned with emotions and unconscious aspects 
of our being is therefore lacking in his theory. In interactive constructivism we 
try to give educators and teachers a broad introduction and critical discussion of 
theories that overcome this lack, such as the philosophies of Lacan, Derrida, and 
Levinas. In social-cognitive theories of education like Gardner’s or Coleman’s there 
is a focus on emotions and emotional learning8 more than on the unconscious. 
This stands in line with the tradition founded by Dewey.9 Especially the four core 
categories mentioned above (experience, context, democracy, interaction) gain a 
new quality if they are reflected with regard to the limits of communication and 
education indicated by the illusion of complete comprehension of the imagina-
tive. Educators and teachers have to accept the limits of understanding the other 
and themselves, and this tempers our view on educational communities and their 
effects. Here again the point is to keep a balance between accepting the imagina-
tive as a limit of control and at the same time building on imaginative desire as 
a resource for learning.
The real, in interactive constructivism, denotes those events that show the 
fundamental relativity of all imaginative and symbolic orientations in our experi-
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ence. This perspective is necessary to avoid subjective exaggerations in construc-
tivism. Even though we can only talk about these real events in the symbolic or 
imagine them—by using symbolic forms like language or pictures in our imagi-
nation—the real can never be swallowed up completely in our imaginations and 
symbolic articulations. Rather, it appears as that gap, disruption, or fissure in be-
tween all meaning constructions, which becomes apparent, for example, in our 
astonishment or speechlessness in face of the precarious side of our experiences. 
It appears in the fractures of doubt or in the abundance of potential meanings im-
plied in sense-certainty which transcend as well as delimit our imaginations and 
symbolic orders of what the world “is” and how it “functions.” Yet, what appears 
as real to us and how we interpret it as part of our experiences ultimately depends 
on our observer positions—as self- or distant-observers. Although the real in its 
immediate appearance often thwarts our imaginative and symbolic solutions, af-
ter the event we will in most cases try to deal with it imaginatively and symboli-
cally in order to calm ourselves down. We tend to transform the insecure state 
of terror, astonishment, uncertainty, and lack of knowledge or the more positive 
of luck, happiness, and satisfaction into symbolic reality, which, as constructed, 
states what has happened, what will turn out, and how things usually happen. 
However, interactive constructivism emphasizes that each reality we construct 
can be subverted by real events we cannot control. When we talk about realities, 
the real is the background, which stretches into the uncertain or unconscious. Our 
field of observation is still open. If constructions of reality were all there were, we 
(as human constructors) would be omnipotent. Alas, in the real world in which 
we live, we often enough experience our limits. The real appears whenever our 
interpretations and orientations, our explanations and ways of understanding, 
our expectations and predictions, do not work out. In education, this implies 
that we cannot ever completely tell whether our educative efforts will turn out 
the way we hope and produce the results we desire. For educators and teachers, 
the real experience often lies in the surprising or even shocking reactions they get 
from their learners. One of the preconditions of becoming an educator/teacher 
is precisely the ability to bear the precariousness—the contingencies and ambi-
guities—of learning and to resist the temptation of all too readily taking refuge 
only in stable orientations.
To sum up, interactive constructivism picks up essential theoretical perspectives 
from pragmatism and tries to reconstruct them for our times. The social and cul-
tural complexity of our present situation must be taken into account in the devel-
opment of educational theories. Educators and teachers must have opportunities 
to gain the necessary resources for critically reflecting on culture, habits, visions, 
and expectations. They have to realize that only by constructing their own solu-
tions in cooperation with their learners can they do justice to the experiences and 
contexts involved. In recent decades, however, there has been an increasing turn 
away from theory in education worldwide. This is partly due to the theories’ grow-
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ing tendency toward specialization, neglect of social, cultural and political issues, 
and detachment from practice. Therefore educators and teachers often make use 
of popular advice literature and tend to ignore the more complex dimensions of 
their practices. A growing number of educators and teachers, though, seem to be-
come more and more aware of the gap between theory and practice. The impact of 
interactive constructivism in German teacher education demonstrates how a large 
group is interested in complex issues of theory and a more profound reflection of 
their own experiences and practices. For them it is necessary to provide theoretical 
meta-perspectives on education: the distinction of roles as observer, participant, 
and agent as well as the perspectives on the symbolic, the imaginative, and the real 
can be useful here. Besides these concepts, which have been in the foreground of this 
essay, interactive constructivism maintains a lot of other conceptual distinctions 
,like the perspectives of construction (versions of subjective reality construction), 
reconstruction (in the sense of cultural reproduction) and deconstruction (critical 
perspectives on omissions in versions of reality) (cf. Reich 2005, 2006). 
In pragmatism, especially Deweyan pragmatism, once we have reinvented it 
for our time, we still find many resources for the proposed account of educational 
visions and theses for their realization. Interactive constructivism tries to draw on 
these sources and to further develop them. It tries to respond to the changed situ-
ation in our time, which is more characterized by ambivalence, ambiguity, and 
lack of clarity than the time of classical pragmatism. Therefore, we have to enlarge 
some views, change the direction of others, and introduce some new perspectives 
on educational questions and answers. The aspects mentioned in this essay gave 
a brief introduction and made some suggestions as to what directions and recon-
structions may be taken into consideration. 
Notes
1. An interpretation of different approaches for constructivist thought is a major 
topic in Reich (1998).
2. Cf. Vygotsky (1978, 1986) and Bruner (1983, 1984, 1990, 1996), Bruner/Haste 
(1987).
3. On this, cf. e.g., paradigmatically, Watzlawick (1967, 1974, 1984).
4. On this, cf. as an introduction, Hickman/Neubert/Reich (2004). Cf. also, in 
particular, Garrison (1997).
5. This is partly due to bad translations.
6. For the German introductions into the approach cf. Reich (1998, 2005, 2006).
7. Cf. for other approaches e.g., Science and Education (1997), Fosnot (1996), 
Lambert et al. (1995, 1996), Larochelle et al. (1998), Steffe & Gale (1995), Tobin (1993) 
among many others.
8. More recent approaches in brain research show the significance of emotions 
for learning processes as well as social-cognitive psychology. Even if both approaches 
differ in their reasons, they come to similar conclusions for practice.
9. Cf. Jim Garrison (1997) for the emotional in Dewey.
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